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Volume 42 2020 Issue 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—SUPERVISING 
CONSUMPTION: THE ARGUMENT FOR SUPERVISED 
INJECTION FACILITIES AS A VALID EXERCISE OF STATES’ 
POLICE POWER 
Jennifer H. Diggles∗ 
From medically assisted treatment to syringe exchange programs, the 
harm reduction movement has emerged as an evidence-based practice in 
response to the growing opioid epidemic.  The supervised injection 
facility is a harm reduction measure that has proven effective in reducing 
overdose deaths and the spread of infectious diseases.  Various countries 
around the world have initiated these programs and realized the benefits, 
and several states in the U.S. have proposed legislation to allow for such 
facilities as part of a broader approach to the opioid problem.  Potential 
implementation of these facilities, however, is challenged on the basis 
that they would violate federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 856—the 
“crack-house” statute.  The threat of federal enforcement effectually 
prevents the passage of state legislation and stifles the positive impact 
supervised injection facilities have on preventing overdose deaths.  
However, an analysis of the legislative evidence combined with the 
concept that such an intervention is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
commerce power jurisprudence, provides an alternate view of the 
federalism argument.  Through appropriate state legislative action, it is 
possible to reconcile current criminal justice policies with the need for 
new and progressive harm reduction strategies in order to advance the 
fight against the opioid epidemic. 
INTRODUCTION 
Former Governor of Pennsylvania, Ed Rendell, got the federal 
government’s attention after announcing the non-profit organization 
Safehouse intended to open a supervised injection facility in 
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Philadelphia.1  In the face of threatened federal prosecution due to the 
purported illegality of such a facility under federal law, Rendell retorted, 
“Come and arrest me first.”2  Philadelphia—like so many other cities, 
towns, neighborhoods, and communities across America—is ravaged by 
the opioid epidemic.3  City leaders and community organizations joined 
forces to implement a lifesaving supervised injection facility as part of a 
progressive harm reduction approach to rising numbers of opioid overdose 
deaths.4 
The current “War on Drugs” approach, involving the pervasive 
criminalization of substance use and abuse, widespread incarceration, and 
unrealistic expectations of immediate cessation and abstinence, is an 
ineffective means of addressing this growing emergency.5  An alternative 
approach to tackling opioid addiction has emerged over the last forty 
years, and many of its interventions have proven efficacious.6  The 
supervised injection facility (SIF) is one such measure.  The SIF, an 
evidence-based harm reduction measure that has been shown to positively 
impact rates of opioid overdose deaths, has been stifled by the assertion 
that such interventions are illegal under the Federal Controlled Substances 
Act (CSA).7  The reality of the opioid crisis requires a paradigm shift in 
 
1. All Things Considered, Philadelphia Plans to Open Medically-Supervised Injection 
Facility, NPR (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/08/655635894/philadelphia-plans-
to-open-medically-supervised-injection-facility [https://perma.cc/C8QQ-DKXB] (quoting Ed 
Rendell, former Governor of Pennsylvania).  Mr. Rendell is on the Board of Directors for 
Safehouse, a non-profit organization planning to provide overdose prevention services.  Id.  This 
interview was in response to the announcement of plans to move forward with the facility 
despite threats of prosecution from the federal government.  Id. 
2. Id. 
3. In 2017, Philadelphia experienced a 34% increase in overdose deaths from the previous 
year—a total of 1,217 deaths.  Frequently Asked Questions, SAFEHOUSE, https://
www.safehousephilly.org/about/faqs#footnote19 [https://perma.cc/H8A2-JJFB]. 
4. Safehouse refers to the service as “overdose prevention,” part of a broader package of 
services available to users struggling with addiction.  See id. 
5. See generally Ernest Drucker, U.S. Drug Policy: Public Health Versus Prohibition, in 
REDUCTION OF DRUG-RELATED HARM 71, 71–73 (E.C. Buning et al. eds., 1992).  See Suchitra 
Rajagopalan, It’s an Overdose Crisis, Not an Opioid Crisis, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE 
(June 14, 2018), http://www.drugpolicy.org/blog/its-overdose-crisis-not-opioid-crisis, 
[https://perma.cc/AHJ3-NHQ5], for a discussion on the impact of the “War on Drugs” as well 
as a call for recognition that the overdose crisis in the United States is not singularly related to 
opioids. 
6. See infra Part I. 
7. See Scott Burris et al., Federalism, Policy Learning, and Local Innovation in Public 
Health: The Case of the Supervised Injection Facility, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1089, 1095–96 
(2009); Andrew Lelling, United States Attorney, Dist. Of Mass., Statement from United States 
Attorney Andrew Lelling Regarding Proposed Injection Sites (Jul. 19, 2018) [hereinafter 
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our legal approach to drug policy and opioid addiction that is more 
inclusive of harm reduction strategies. 
Part I of this Note briefly examines the extent of the opioid crisis and 
explores the emergence, evolution, and efficacy of the harm reduction 
approach to substance abuse treatment.  Part II lays the foundation of 
statutory and common law principles implicated when evaluating the 
legality of SIFs.  Using that foundation, Part III applies those principles to 
the SIF and argues the SIF is beyond the scope of Congress’s commerce 
power.  Part IV discusses the federal preemption doctrine, conducts an 
analysis of potential state laws authorizing SIFs, and asserts future state 
laws authorizing SIFs would survive a preemption challenge.  This Note 
concludes that implementation of SIFs as harm reduction interventions 
under state law would be a valid exercise of states’ police power. 
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE HARM REDUCTION APPROACH AND THE 
EFFICACY OF ITS METHODS 
Crisis.  Epidemic.  Public health emergency.  These terms have 
something in common: they are all used to describe the opioid situation in 
the United States.8  Between 1999 and 2017 over 700,000 people died 
from opioid overdose.9  In 2017 alone, there were 47,600 opioid overdose 
deaths.10  For many, if not most, prescription pain medication acts as the 
primary entry point into opioid abuse or addiction.11  Once the 
 
Regarding Proposed Injection Sites], https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/statement-us-
attorney-andrew-lelling-regarding-proposed-injection-sites [https://perma.cc/NR4W-5RXC]. 
8. About the Epidemic, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Sept. 4, 2019), 
https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/QN35-SCVX]; 
Determination That a Public Health Emergency Exists, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY 
(Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/opioids.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/V2UU-ZRKR]. 
9. Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/9P56-LT7R]. 
10. Drug Overdose Deaths, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html [https://perma.cc/X957-GYDT]. 
11. About the Epidemic, supra note 8.  “Abuse” refers to substance use that results in 
adverse consequences for the user while “addiction”—or dependence—refers to the user’s 
inability to control his consumption despite serious negative consequences.  JOHN JUNG, 
ALCOHOL, OTHER DRUGS, & BEHAVIOR: PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES 68 (2d 
ed., 2010). 
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prescriptions run out, many are left with no option but to obtain the drugs 
illicitly.12  For some, this means resorting to heroin.13 
In 2017, over 15,000 people died from heroin overdoses alone.14  
Although heroin can be sniffed or snorted, the most typical route of 
administration is intravenous injection.15  Injecting drug users (IDUs) are 
one of the country’s most vulnerable populations, as they are often 
homeless and frequently have co-occurring mental health disorders.16  In 
addition to the personal danger of overdose, injection drug use brings with 
it other risky behaviors, such as needle sharing or use of dirty “works.”17  
These behaviors have led to the spread of infectious diseases, such as HIV 
and Hepatitis C, which is a major public health concern.18  Other public 
health dangers associated with intravenous drug use include skin 
infection, public use and overdose, and used syringes discarded in public 
spaces.19  The grave language associated with the reality of the opioid 
situation in the United States speaks to the void left by inadequate legal 
options for new and progressive treatment measures.  Approaches 
currently being utilized are unsuccessful in battling the epidemic.20 
The “War on Drugs,” along with our current criminalization and 
abstinence policies, has failed in slowing the opioid crisis,21 as evidenced 
 
12. Heroin Overdose Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/heroin.html [https://perma.cc/A3BW-58GW].  “Past 
misuse of prescription opioids is the strongest risk factor for starting heroin use, especially 
among people who became dependent upon or abused prescription opioids in the past year.”  Id. 
13. Heroin: Overview, NAT’L INST. OF DRUG ABUSE, https://
www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/heroin/overview [https://perma.cc/QM4G-
5P27]; see Heroin Overdose Data, supra note 12. 
14. See Heroin Overdose Data, supra note 12. 
15. Id. 
16. See generally Ezra Susser et al., Injection Drug Use Among Homeless Adults with 
Severe Mental Illness, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 5 (1997), 
https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.87.5.854 (last visited Jan. 3, 2020). 
17. HIV/AIDS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/risk/idu.html [https://perma.cc/FXR3-E6B8].  “Works” refers to the 
equipment necessary to use the drug of choice.  For heroin users, this includes the syringes, 
needles, cookers, cotton, and water.  Getting Off Right, A Safety Manual for Injection Drug 
Users, HARM REDUCTION COALITION 11, https://harmreduction.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/getting-off-right.pdf [https://perma.cc/358S-ZYUX]. 
18. HIV/AIDS, supra note 17. 
19. See Mary Clare Kennedy et al., Public Health and Public Order Outcomes Associated 
with Supervised Drug Consumption Facilities: A Systematic Review, CURRENT HIV/AIDS 
REPORTS (2017). 
20. See Burris et al., supra note 7, at 1096. 
21. See Valerie A. Earnshaw et al., Drug Addiction Stigma in the Context of Methadone 
Maintenance Therapy: An Investigation into Understudied Sources of Stigma, 11 INT’L J. 
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by a 200% increase in opioid overdoses since 2000.22  Research shows 
involuntary abstinence—such as that predicated by incarceration, 
substance abuse treatment, or hospitalization—is ineffective in reducing 
use of heroin and other synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl, among IDUs.23  
In fact, brief periods of abstinence, followed by relapse, significantly 
increase a user’s risk of overdose.24  Therefore, it has become imperative 
to take an approach that meets the user where they are rather than 
demanding abstinence. 
Harm reduction is an approach to treating substance abuse that 
focuses on minimizing harms associated with addictive behavior for both 
the user and the wider community.25  The concept of harm reduction is 
based on the notion that complete and immediate cessation of use is 
unrealistic, especially among IDUs.26  The goal instead is to curtail the 
health risks associated with injection drug use, such as morbidity and 
mortality, the spread of disease, public use and nuisance, criminal activity, 
and other attendant risky behaviors.27 
The development of the harm reduction model in the United States 
has been described as “a conflict between multiple conflicting 
social/historical forces.”28  On the one hand, there is social activism and 
evidence-based research promoting harm reduction methods; on the other, 
the “long tradition of moralistic condemnation” of illicit drug use.29  The 
emergence of the medical model of addiction (the disease model) was—
and remains—at odds with the stigma attached to illicit drug use, and 
 
MENTAL HEALTH ADDICTION 110, 110–11 (2013) (discussing how the “war on drugs” 
contributes to the stigma attached to addiction).  Stigma is a barrier to effective treatment.  Id. 
22. Melissa Vallejo, Note, Safer Bathrooms in Syringe Exchange Programs: Injecting 
Progress into the Harm Reduction Movement, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1185, 1185 (2018). 
23. An Act Relative to Combatting Addiction, Accessing Treatment, Reducing 
Prescriptions, and Enhancing Prevention: Hearing on H.4033 Before the Joint Committee on 
Mental Health, Substance Use & Recovery, 2018 Leg., 190th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2018) [hereinafter 
Combatting Addiction] (testimony of the AIDS Action Comm., Inc.) (on file with author). 
24. See Jonathan Giftos & Lello Tesema, When Less is More: Reforming the Criminal 
Justice Response to the Opioid Epidemic, 57 NO. 1 JUDGES’ J. 28, 28 (2018); see also 
Combatting Addiction, supra note 23. 
25. Diane E. Logan & G. Alan Marlatt, Harm Reduction Therapy: A Practice-Friendly 
Review of Research, 66 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 201, 201 (2010); Ming-sum Tsui, The Harm 
Reduction Approach Revisited: An International Perspective, 43 INT’L SOC. WORK 243, 245 
(2000). 
26. Tsui, supra note 25, at 245. 
27. Leo Beletsky et al., The Law (and Politics) of Safe Injection Facilities in the United 
States, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 231, 231 (2008). 
28. Don C. Des Jarlais, Harm Reduction in the USA: The Research Perspective and an 
Archive to David Purchase, HARM REDUCTION J. 1, 1 (2017). 
29. Id. at 2. 
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especially to IDUs.  This model asserts addiction is an illness and views 
abstinence as the only way, while society views addiction as an amoral 
personal choice.30  Despite this conflict, harm reduction methods and 
interventions have proved efficacious, gaining widespread momentum in 
the substance abuse treatment field.31 
A. Evolution: From Methadone Maintenance to the SIF 
One of the first harm reduction measures borne out of the disease 
model was methadone maintenance therapy (MMT),32 and it remains the 
primary treatment approach to opioid addiction.33  MMT showed “the 
possibility of reducing both individual and societal problems associated 
with drug use without requiring that users cease all . . . drug use.”34  
Additional medications, such as buprenorphine and naltrexone, have 
emerged as efficacious in the treatment of opioid addiction.35  These 
medications, used in conjunction with behavioral therapies and 
counseling, form another treatment approach called Medication Assisted 
Treatment (MAT).36  Critics assert MAT is merely drug substitution that 
still produces a long-term user.37  However, research proves MAT 
successfully helps individuals sustain recovery from opioids, with the 
general goal of eventually weaning the individual off the medication 
altogether.38 
 
30. Id.; see generally PHILIP J. FLORES, GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY WITH ADDICTED 
POPULATIONS: AN INTEGRATION OF TWELVE-STEP AND PSYCHODYNAMIC THEORY 65–95 (3d 
ed., 2007). 
31. See generally Kathryn Hawk et al., Reducing Fatal Opioid Overdose: Prevention, 
Treatment and Harm Reduction Strategies, 88 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 535 (2015). 
32. SAMHSA, Dept. of Health & Human Serv., Medication Assisted Treatment for 
Opioid Addiction in Opioid Treatment Programs 16, https://www.asam.org/
docs/advocacy/samhsa_tip43_matforopioidaddiction.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [https://perma.cc/VN2C-
QVYA].  MMT was first approved for the treatment of heroin addiction in early 1970’s.  Id. at 
18. 
33. Mary-Ann Macswain et al., Assessing the Impact of Methadone Maintenance 
Treatment (MMT) on Post-Release Recidivism Among Male Federal Correctional Inmates in 
Canada 41 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 380, 381 (2014). 
34. Des Jarlais, supra note 28, at 2. 
35. Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT), SAMHSA, https://www.samhsa.gov/
medication-assisted-treatment [https://perma.cc/K9XK-QLKB]. 
36. Id. 
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Further harm reduction measures emerged in the 1980s in response 
to the AIDS epidemic, primarily in the form of syringe exchange programs 
(SEPs).39  SEPs are social programs that permit IDUs to exchange used 
syringes for clean ones with the purpose of reducing the risk of spreading 
infectious diseases, such as HIV and Hepatitis C.40  SEPs were met with 
resistance as critics viewed them as condoning substance use.41  The 
federal government has maintained legislation preventing the use of any 
federal funds to purchase syringes intended for public distribution,42 and 
many states have paraphernalia laws criminalizing possession of 
syringes.43  Despite early challenges, SEPs are now statutorily authorized 
in several states and have proven efficacious at reducing the spread of 
infectious diseases.44 
Most SEPs offer more than just clean needles.  Services available to 
participants include education, access to addiction treatment, MAT, and 
peer support groups.45  Some SEPs offer the additional service of post-
consumption observation rooms.46  These rooms provide a space for over-
sedated individuals to be monitored by medical professionals as a 
preventive measure.47  The SIF arises from the SEP, and would merely 
take current practices one-step farther. 
 
39. Des Jarlais, supra note 28, at 2–3. 
40. Vallejo, supra note 22, at 1190–91. 
41. Id. at 1192. 
42. Congress Ends Ban of Federal Funding for Needle Exchange Programs, All Things 
Considered, NPR (Jan. 8, 2016, 4:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/ https://www.samhsa.gov/
medication-assisted-treatment 2016/01/08/462412631/congress-ends-ban-on-federal-funding-
for-needle-exchange-programs [https://perma.cc/4VEP-2MDM].  Federal funds are still 
prohibited from going toward the purchase of syringes themselves, but may be used toward 
other costs of maintaining a syringe exchange program.  Id. 
43. Vallejo, supra note 22, at 1196. 
44. Id. at 1186; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-124 (West 2017).  Other states 
unofficially authorize the existence of SEPs through the use of discretion of police and local 
authorities.  Id.  See also, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 325-112 (West 2013); MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH–GEN § 24–802 (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 215 (West 2016).  
Many states with statutory authorization have decriminalized paraphernalia possession.  See, 
e.g., id. 
45. See Substance Use Disorder Services, BOS. HEALTHCARE FOR THE HOMELESS 
PROGRAM, https://www.bhchp.org/specialized-services/addiction-services [https://perma.cc/
6QDR-CU6D].  Additionally, many states, such as Massachusetts, have initiated programs 
increasing public access to naloxone, an antidote for opiate overdose, which is available to users 
at such sites.  2018 Mass. Acts Ch. 208. 
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SIFs go by many names—drug consumption rooms, safe 
consumption sites, or safe injection sites.48  No matter how referenced, the 
SIF is a harm reduction measure used successfully in numerous countries 
to combat opioid overdose deaths.49  The SIF is a safe space where IDUs 
may go to self-administer an illicit substance, such as heroin, without fear 
of arrest.50  Medical staff is present to provide sterile equipment, answer 
questions regarding safe injection practices, and provide emergency care 
in case of an accidental overdose.51  Additionally, SIFs serve as an access 
point to treatment and other wraparound services not readily available to 
IDUs.52 
SIFs provide a safer alternative for IDUs who are frequently forced 
into hiding out of fear of arrest, using in dark alleyways or “shooting 
galleries” to inject.53  Their primary purpose is to prevent overdose deaths 
from opioid use.54  Access to a SIF would prevent these accidental deaths 
and decrease risk to the community.55  In fact, in the 120 or so SIFs active 
around the world, there has never been a single overdose death.56  
Moreover, studies indicate a reduction in other public dangers, such as 
discarded syringes and litter from other injection-related materials.57 
Additional research on efficacy reflects a positive impact on crime 
rates, public order, and access to services.58  A cooperative relationship 
between law enforcement and the SIF as a public health initiative 
 
48. See generally Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 3 (using terms such as “safe 
injection sites,” “supervised consumption rooms,” and “supervised consumption sites” 
interchangeably). 
49. FINAL REPORT OF THE EVALUATION OF THE SYDNEY MEDICALLY SUPERVISED 
INJECTING CENTRE, MSIC EVALUATION COMMITTEE at 2 (2003) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. 
50. Burris et al., supra note 7, at 1100. 
51. Id. at 1096. 
52. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 3. 
53. See Alternatives to Public Injecting, HARM REDUCTION COALITION (2016), 
https://harmreduction.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Alternatives-to-Public-Injection-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4BL-6M97].  “Public injection is often a rushed practice in 
attempt to avoid detection and arrest.”  Id. 
54. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 3.  Medical staff in these facilities only 
provides tips on safe injection procedures; they will not physically assist or inject a patient.  Id. 
55. FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 150. 
56. See Combatting Addiction, supra note 23 (testimony of Brandon DL Marshal, PhD) 
(on file with Author); see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 49; Thomas Kerr et al., Impact of a 
Medically Supervised Safer Injection Facility on Community Drug Use Patterns: A Before and 
After Study, 332 BMJ 201 (2006). 
57. Combatting Addiction, supra note 23 (testimony of Brandon DL Marshal, PhD). 
58. SIFs, DCRs and SCS, HARM REDUCTION COALITION, https://harmreduction.org/
issues/sifs/ [https://perma.cc/4T2L-HUXU]. 
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demonstrates an increase in public order.59  By referring IDUs to SIFs, 
police are able to minimize concerns such as discarded needles while also 
decreasing the risk of HIV or other infectious diseases and violence 
amongst a generally hard to reach population.60  Despite fears to the 
contrary, research suggests SIFs have not led to an increase in drug 
trafficking and dealing offenses in areas where they operate.61  However, 
instances of petty crimes, such as car theft, have decreased.62  These 
positive impacts, combined with the high probability of a decrease in 
opioid overdose deaths, speak to the vital role SIFs can play, especially in 
areas currently devastated by the opioid epidemic. 
B. Barriers to Implementation 
Notwithstanding widespread acceptance as an evidence-based harm 
reduction approach to preventing overdose deaths, the United States 
remains reluctant to allow SIFs to open in states that desire to use the 
strategy to protect the health of their citizens.63  This reluctance is based 
largely on federalism tensions, specifically between federal laws that 
purportedly prohibit the concept of the SIF even when authorized by state 
legislatures.64  The federal government argues that the supremacy of 
federal drug policy over state law explicitly prohibits SIFs from being 
introduced.65  Unlike with medical and recreational marijuana, no state 
 
59. Kora Debeck et al., Police and Public Health Partnerships: Evidence From the 
Evaluation of Vancouver’s Supervised Injection Facility, SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, 
PREVENTION & POL’Y (2008), https://substanceabusepolicy.biomedcentral.com/track/
pdf/10.1186/1747-597X-3-11. 
60. Id. at 3–4. 
61. Evan Wood et al., Impact of the Medically Supervised Safer Injection Facility on Drug 
Dealing and Other Drug-Related Crime, SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, PREVENTION & 
POL’Y 3 (2006), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/7059387_Impact_of_a_
Medically_Supervised_Safer_Injecting_Facility_on_Drug_Dealing_and_Other_Drug-
Related_Crime [https://perma.cc/P6SR-22SY]; SIFs, DCRs and SCS, supra note 58. 
62. See Wood et al., supra note 61; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 150 (noting 
no increase in drug-related crimes). 
63. See Cylas Martell-Crawford, Safe Injection Facilities: A Path to Legitimacy, 11 ALB. 
GOV’T. L. REV. 124, 127–28 (2017) (discussing how a lack of public support significantly 
impacts the chances of effective implementation of SIFs).  This article also discusses the issue 
of local authorities and municipalities who desire to open SIFs, but are preempted by state laws, 
demonstrating the layers of government that may impede harm reduction measures.  Id. 
64. See infra Parts II & III. 
65. See Vernal Coleman, Threat of Federal Enforcement Complicates Seattle’s Proposed 
Supervised Injection Site, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 31, 2018, 7:11 AM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/homeless/threat-of-federal-enforcement-
complicates-seattles-proposed-safe-injection-site/ [https://perma.cc/M6RA-Q2PG].  See 
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has passed legislation that permits the implementation of a SIF,66 and 
therefore, there have been no legal challenges regarding constitutionality.  
Many states and municipalities across the country have proposed or 
considered legislation to authorize SIFs.67  For example, in 2018 
California passed legislation authorizing approval of overdose prevention 
programs in San Francisco; however, the governor vetoed the bill.68  In 
other instances, the federal government has stepped in and threatened 
enforcement.69  The federal government’s hook is in the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA), specifically § 856, and the commerce power.70  
The next section of this Note will review the CSA and pertinent sections 
before discussing the case law supporting the government’s use of the 
commerce power to control state-level regulation of illicit substances. 
II. THE CSA, THE “CRACK-HOUSE” STATUTE, AND COMMERCE POWER 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Many states are evaluating the legal risks and implications of 
authorizing SIFs under state law,71 and, thus far, the threat of criminal or 
 
generally Complaint, United States v. Safehouse, No. 2:19-cv-00519-GAM (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 
2019), ECF No. 1. 
66. See Bobby Allyn, Judge Rules Planned Supervised Injection Site Does Not Violate 
Federal Drug Laws, NPR (Last updated Oct. 2, 2019, 7:30 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/10/02/766500743/judge-rules-plan-for-safehouse-drug-injection-
site-in-philadelphia-can-go-forward [https://perma.cc/H9FJ-FTAN].  California passed 
legislation in 2018 only to have the governor veto the bill.  Assemb. B. 186, 2017–2018 Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
67. Assemb. B. 186, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (vetoed by governor); S.B. 18-
040, 71st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018) (vote indefinitely postponed); S.B. 288, 2018 
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018) (reported unfavorably out of committee); S. 1081, 190th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 
2018) (sent to study); S.B. 6254, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018) (referred to committee). 
68. Assemb. B. 186, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).  Legislation has again been 
proposed in California, this time with likely support of the new Governor.  Katie Zezima, 
California Approves Supervised Opioid Injection Facility, Faces Federal Opposition, 




69. On February 5, 2019, the federal government filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the 
non-profit organization Safehouse from opening a SIF in Philadelphia.  Complaint at 8, United 
States v. Safehouse, No. 2:19-cv-00519-GAM (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2019), ECF No. 1.  See also 
Regarding Proposed Injection Sites, supra note 7; Zezima, supra note 68. 
70. Complaint at 8, United States v. Safehouse, No. 2:19-cv-00519-GAM (E.D. Pa. Feb. 
5, 2019), ECF No. 1. 
71. See Assemb. B. 186, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); SB18-040, 72 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018); S. 288, 2018 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); S. 1081 190th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 
2018); SB 6254,65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018). 
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civil liability for medical professionals and others involved with these 
programs has effectually prevented passage of affirmative legislation.72  
As state legislatures consider the feasibility and potential ramifications of 
authorizing SIFs, there are important factors to consider—the textual hook 
in § 856, whether SIFs are in conflict with commerce power 
jurisprudence, and how the proposed legislation would stack up under 
federal preemption analysis. 
The CSA establishes federal drug policy in the United States.73  The 
CSA governs the manufacture, distribution, possession, and importation 
of both licit and illicit substances.74  Within the Act, illicit substances are 
placed into schedules—a means of classifying the dangerousness and 
addictive potential of a substance.75  The Supreme Court has described the 
CSA as “legislation that would consolidate various drug laws on the books 
into a comprehensive statute, provide meaningful regulation over 
legitimate sources of drugs to prevent diversion into illegal channels, and 
strengthen law enforcement tools against the traffic in illicit drugs.”76  
This purpose, on its face, does not appear at odds with the concept of the 
SIF; however, one section of the CSA, in particular, poses a threat.  
A. The “Crack-House” Statute as a Response to the Crack Epidemic 
The “crack-house statute,” 21 U.S.C. § 856, is the section of the CSA 
that federal law enforcement typically cites as rendering the SIF illegal.  
The section states: 
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful to— 
(1) knowingly open . . . or maintain any place for the purpose of 
manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance;  
(2) manage or control any place . . . either as an owner, lessee, agent, 
employee, occupant, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally 
rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use, with or without 
compensation, the place for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, 
storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.77 
 
72. See Regarding Proposed Injection Sites, supra note 7. 
73. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2018). 
74. Id. 
75. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2018). 
76. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005). 
77. 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2018). 
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The plain language of the statute suggests that a SIF would be in 
violation of federal law.78  The purpose of the SIF is to allow individuals 
to safely inject previously obtained illicit drugs, meaning it would be 
opened for the purpose of making the space available for use of a 
controlled substance.  However, examination of the legislative evidence 
surrounding Act’s passage supports the argument that this section was not 
meant to apply to a medical facility utilizing evidence-based treatment 
practices.79 
Congress enacted § 856 as part of the overall drug legislation to 
prohibit the use and existence of so-called “crack-houses,” where cocaine 
was manufactured or used.80  Despite the legislative evidence from the 
statute’s enactment, courts have read its language broadly to include a 
variety of structures.81  Yet it appears the statute has rarely, if ever, been 
used in cases where the activity involved was merely personal use.82  
Furthermore, the statute has not been interpreted in any case to apply to 
legitimate medical facilities, which, when authorized under state law, 
would be the form that the SIF would take.83  In fact, a federal district 
court in Pennsylvania recently held that, based in part on the legislative 
evidence, § 856 does not apply to SIFs.84  Although the district court’s 
 
78. See NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:8 (7th ed., updated 2018).  “Plain meaning” interpretation 
considers “how the public to whom it is addressed understands the act.”  Id. 
79. Memorandum at 3, United States v. Safehouse, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170912, at 
*58–67 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2019) (No. 19-0519), ECF No. 133 (“Although the language, taken to 
its broadest extent, can certainly be interpreted to apply to . . . safe injection site[s], to attribute 
such meaning to the legislators who adopted the language is illusory.”); see Frequently Asked 
Questions, supra note 3. 
80. H. R. 5484, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. Sl3779 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986); 
Richard Belfiore, Annotation, Validity, Constructions and Application of Federal “Crack-
House Statute” Criminalizing Maintaining, Making or Distributing Controlled Drugs, 116 
A.L.R. FED. 345, § 2[a] (1993). 
81. See United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying the statute 
to a religious ministry); United States v. Hurt, 137 F. App’x 192, 193 (10th Cir. June 29, 2005) 
(an apartment building); United States v. Ramsey, 406 F.3d 426, 428–29 (7th Cir. 2005) (a 
mobile home); United States v. Bilis, 170 F.3d 88, 89–90 (1st Cir. 1999) (a bar); United States 
v. Tamez, 941 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 1991) (a car dealership). 
82. Burris et al., supra note 7, at 1122 n.164. 
83. Cases where medical facilities were charged under § 856 often involved the 
prescription of opioids outside the scope of legitimate medical practice.  See United States v. 
Lang, 717 F. App’x 523, 546–47 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Stegawski, 687 F. App’x 509, 
510 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Sadler, 750 F.3d 585, 592–93 (6th Cir. 2014). 
84. Safehouse, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170912.  In denying the Government’s Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings, the Judge reasoned that there was “no support for the view that 
Congress meant to criminalize projects” such as SIFs under § 856, and declined to expand the 
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decision is likely to be appealed,85 it only strengthens the argument that 
the SIF is beyond the scope of the CSA and federal preemption.86 
B. Commerce Power Jurisprudence  
The federal government’s expansive regulatory policies, evidenced 
by the CSA, are founded on the government’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce.87  In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court considered the 
reach of the congressional commerce power as it pertains to state-level 
law legalizing the use of illicit substances.88  In Raich, the court upheld 
enforcement of the CSA despite the legalization of medicinal marijuana 
under California law.89  In 1996, California passed the Compassionate Use 
Act, legalizing the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes when 
“prescribed” by a licensed physician.90  The Act permitted cultivation, 
distribution, and possession of medical marijuana by individuals under the 
care of a prescribing physician.91  Raich involved two California residents 
under the care of physicians who recommended the use of marijuana as 
 
statute.  Id.  The judge did not analyze any other issue raised in the complaint or answer and 
counterclaims. 
85. Statement of United States Attorney McSwain on Today’s Opinion in the United 
States v. Safehouse Litigation, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 2, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/statement-united-states-attorney-mcswain-today-s-
opinion-united-states-v-safehouse [https://perma.cc/3YDQ-CPU9]. 
86. See infra Part IV.  When it comes to statutory interpretation, the canons of construction 
favor plain meaning over legislative intent.  Although the language of § 856 facially appears 
clear as to its meaning, there remains some ambiguity with regard to how the statute should be 
applied, since legislators at the time of drafting could not have “anticipate[d] all future 
circumstances and completely eliminate[d] the need for judicial interpretation.”  SINGER & 
SINGER, supra note 78, at § 45:2.  Courts may consider legislative purpose and public policy 
when attempting to clarify a statute’s intent or meaning.  Id. at § 45.9.  Additionally, courts may 
view a statutory provision in the context of the statute as a whole, even when the language of 
the provision appears plain on its face.  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).  Courts 
may also reject the “plain meaning” of a statute if that “meaning has led to absurd or futile 
results,” or “merely [ ] unreasonable one[s].”  United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 
534, 543 (1940).  Construing the plain meaning of § 856 to apply to SIFs is arguably 
unreasonable due to the fact that they fall within the states’ traditional police power of protecting 
the health and safety of citizens.  See infra Part III.B & C. 
87. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see HARRY L. HOGAN, FEDERAL CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCES ACT (TITLES II & III, P.L. 91-513): SUMMARY AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Rep. 
No. 80-74 EPW at 7 (1980). 
88. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
89. Id. 
90. See Compassionate Use Act, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (West 1996).  
Doctors do not necessarily prescribe marijuana in the same way they do other medications; 
rather, the doctor recommends the use of marijuana for treatment of a condition.  Id. 
91. Id. 
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treatment for their medical conditions.92  Under the Act, the respondents 
were permitted to cultivate marijuana for personal, medicinal use.  
Nonetheless, federal agents seized the respondents’ cannabis plants, and 
they subsequently commenced the action.93 
Applying its holding in Wickard v. Filburn,94 the Supreme Court 
established that “Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is 
not itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes 
that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation 
of the interstate market in that commodity.”95  Therefore, Congress has the 
power to regulate the marijuana, even though it is for personal use only, 
because permitting small-scale cultivation would impact both supply and 
demand,96 thereby undercutting the regulatory scheme.97  This impact on 
the market represents economic activity. 
The Court continually holds economic activity that substantially 
impacts interstate commerce falls within Congress’s commerce power.98  
Conversely, the Court has held that non-economic activity does not fall 
within the commerce power.99  In United States v. Lopez, the Court struck 
down the Gun-Free School Zone Act that prohibited the possession of 
firearms in a school zone.100  There, Lopez was a twelfth-grade student 
who brought a concealed weapon to school and was charged under the 
Act.101  Lopez argued the Act was an overreach of congressional power.102 
In its analysis, the Court applied a three-part framework to identify 
categories of activity that Congress may regulate using its commerce 
power: (1) channels, (2) instrumentalities, and (3) those activities having 
 
92. Raich, 545 U.S. at 7. 
93. Id. 
94. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129–30 (1942) (holding that the cultivation of 
wheat for personal use was an intrastate activity having a significant impact on interstate 
commerce and thus fell under Congress’s Commerce Power). 
95. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added). 
96. Id. at 30–31.  The Court finds that drug-related activities are “quintessentially 
economic.”  Id.  Examining the definition of the word “economic” the Court includes 
production, distribution, and consumption as economic activity. 
97. Id. at 18. 
98. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128–29; United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971) 
(holding that loan sharking practices had a substantial effect on interstate commerce); Monson 
v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 589 F.3d 952, 952 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that regulation 
of cultivation of industrialized hemp was within the government’s commerce power). 
99. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
100. Id. at 551. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 552. 
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a substantial effect on interstate commerce.103  The Court agreed with 
Lopez’s argument because the Act failed the substantial effects test.104  
The Act was deemed not to be part of a broader regulatory scheme that 
would be “undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.”105  
Going one step further, the Court distinguished the possession of a weapon 
on school property from an activity that arises out of a commercial 
transaction, which would, in the aggregate, impact interstate commerce.106 
The Court continued to distinguish regulation of economic versus 
non-economic activity in United States v. Morrison.107  Morrison involved 
the question of whether a section of the Violence Against Women Act that 
provided for a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence was 
constitutional.108  The Supreme Court found the section in question, 
§ 13981, to be an unconstitutional overreach of Congress’s commerce 
power.109  Applying the same analytic framework used in Lopez, the Court 
held that “gender motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the 
phrase, economic activity.”110  Despite an enormous number of 
congressional findings supporting the aggregate impact of gender-related 
violence on interstate commerce, the Court maintained its position.111  
Viewing the concept of the SIF through this precedential lens supports the 
argument that SIFs are congruent with commerce power holdings. 
III. APPLYING COMMERCE POWER JURISPRUDENCE TO THE SIF SETS 
THE STAGE FOR VALIDATION 
Parts I and II laid out the foundations for modern commerce power 
jurisprudence by examining three prominent cases.  This Note will now 
relate those concepts to the SIF, and through careful analysis and 
application of the Supreme Court’s holdings, argue that the SIF is non-
 
103. Id. at 559–61 (citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 155–56). 
104. Id.  The Court stated, “[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”  Id. at 560. 
105. Id. at 561. 
106. Id. 
107. See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
108. Id. at 601–02.  The case originated with a claim by a female college student that two 
male students raped her and that she was entitled to relief under § 13981 of the Violence Against 
Women Act.  Id. 
109. Id. at 617. 
110. Id. at 613. 
111. Id. at 614 (“Simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.”) (quoting United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557(1995)). 
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economic and therefore state-level SIF implementation would be a valid 
exercise of police power. 
A. SIFs are Consistent with the Supreme Court’s Holdings in Raich, 
Lopez, and Morrison Because they are Non-Economic and 
Therefore Outside the Scope of Congressional Commerce Power 
The concept of the SIF and the state laws that would permit its 
functionality are not at odds with the holdings of Raich, Lopez, or 
Morrison.  Possession and use of an illicit substance do not involve the 
channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce.112  Therefore, we are 
left to apply the “substantial effects test.”113  Under this analysis, SIFs do 
not substantially impact interstate commerce such that failure to prohibit 
the activity would “undercut the regulation” of the illicit drug market. 
The consumption of otherwise-obtained illicit substances within the 
SIF would not have an economic impact on supply and demand, as did the 
cultivation of marijuana for personal use in Raich.114  In making this 
argument, it is imperative to stress the fact that the purchase of drugs that 
would be consumed in a SIF would occur independently of the SIF’s 
existence.  There is no evidence that the presence of the SIF increases the 
rates of purchase of illicit drugs.115  In fact, the presence of SIFs is more 
likely to decrease the amount of drugs consumed in the market by 
increasing access to substance abuse treatment and other vital services.116  
Additionally, no evidence suggests that new users are enticed by the 
presence of SIFs117 or that SIFs attract additional users into the area.118 
Further support comes from the fact that there is no cultivation on the 
part of the user as there was in Raich, which, in the Court’s view, 
strengthened the connection to the interstate market.119  The logic of 
Raich, based on Wickard, turns on the point that an individual cultivates 
 
112. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–61 (1995). 
113. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (using the substantial effects test to 
determine that personal cultivation and use of marijuana impacts supply and demand, affecting 
interstate commerce). 
114. Id. at 18. 
115. Wood et al., supra note 61, at 3. 
116. Burris et al., supra note 7, at 1101. 
117. DAGMAR HEDRICH, EUROPEAN REPORT ON DRUG CONSUMPTION ROOMS 83 
(2004), http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_2944_EN_consumption_rooms_
report.pdf.  New users would suggest an increase in demand. 
118. See id. at 81.  Research thus far has not produced data sufficient to evaluate a “pull 
effect.”  Id. 
119. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 30 (2005).  The cultivation, even for personal use, 
impacted supply and demand of the commodity in the market.  Id. 
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his own marijuana in lieu of purchasing it in the market.120  No analogous 
application to the SIF exists.  Although participants would possess illicit 
drugs, such possession would not stem from their cultivation of the 
product.  Moreover, the Court in Raich was also concerned with the 
potential for homegrown marijuana to be diverted into illicit channels, 
thus falling into the “class of activities” substantially affecting interstate 
commerce.121  This concern is also inapplicable to the SIF as SIFs 
contribute in no way to the amount of drugs present in the market.122 
Opponents could argue that the SIF would “undercut” the purpose of 
the regulatory scheme—to “prohibit entirely the possession or use of 
substances listed in Schedule I, except as part of a strictly controlled 
research project.”123  However, this argument is tenuous because the goal 
of the SIF actually works toward the same purpose as the regulatory 
scheme by increasing access to services such as detox, counseling, and 
medication-assisted treatment.124  Furthermore, the volume of drugs that 
would be consumed in these facilities would simply be consumed 
elsewhere, most likely in a public space, presenting a danger to the 
community.125 
Further, the operation of a SIF differs from marijuana legalization 
schemes in that it does not involve a business, lending support to the SIF’s 
non-economic nature.126  Both medical and recreational marijuana 
dispensaries operate as retail businesses,127 and marijuana is viewed 
similarly to a commodity.128  SIF participants would not purchase or 
 
120. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).  Home-grown wheat competes with 
wheat in the marketplace as it meets the need of someone who would otherwise purchase the 
wheat elsewhere.  Id. 
121. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. 
122. Wood et al., supra note 61, at 3 (discussing how research indicates no increase in 
drug trafficking, or use and supply offenses). 
123. Raich, 545 U.S. at 24.  Section 812 of the CSA established five schedules in which 
drugs and other substances are classified.  Schedule I substances are those deemed to have high 
abuse potential, no legitimate medical purpose, and are not safe for use, even under medical 
supervision.  21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2018). 
124. Burris et al., supra note 7, at 1101–03. 
125. Kennedy et al., supra note 19. 
126. Most facilities proposing to open SIFs, or to add it to its list of services, are non-
profit organizations.  See, e.g., About, SAFEHOUSE, https://www.safehousephilly.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/DCY2-XFFZ]. 
127. Dispensaries require business licensing within the state.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS 
c. 94G, § 5 (recreational) and MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 94I, § 2 (medical). 
128. A commodity is defined as “an economic good” or a “product of agriculture.”  
Commodity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
commodity [https://perma.cc/P73W-DYT4].  See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942). 
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acquire the drug at the facility, and they would not pay to use the 
facility.129  No economic activity occurs, merely consumption.  The SIF 
fails the test because it would not have a substantial effect on the interstate 
market for illicit substances. 
The Court in Lopez and Morrison held that Congress could not 
regulate non-economic activity.130  As detailed above, the mere use and 
possession of an illicit substance in a SIF does not render the SIF 
economic in nature.  Opponents of the SIF may argue that even if the 
consumption (as a non-economic activity) argument prevails, the 
possession of illicit drugs within the SIF would still bring it within the 
grasp of the CSA.  Possession of opioids in a state-sanctioned SIF should 
be viewed similarly to the possession of a weapon in a school zone in 
Lopez, where the Court refused to tie such possession to the underlying 
economic transaction.131  There, the Court distinguished Lopez from its 
holding in United States v. Bass.132  Bass involved 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a) 
prohibiting possession of a weapon by a felon.133  The statute in Bass 
expressly referred to one who “receives, possesses or transports in 
commerce or affecting commerce . . . any firearm.”134  Conversely, the 
statute in Lopez did not contain similar language; therefore, the Court 
stated it had “no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach 
to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit 
connection with or effect on interstate commerce.”135  Similarly, 
applicable provisions of the CSA make no mention of interstate 
commerce.136 
Opponents may argue further that Congress explicitly stated in its 
findings within the CSA that there is always a connection with interstate 
commerce.137  However, it is important to note that SIF participants would 
 
129. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 3; Insite: Supervised Consumption Site, 
VANCOUVER COASTAL HEALTH, http://www.vch.ca/Locations-Services/result?res_id=964 
[https://perma.cc/T8E7-UP96] (indicating that all funding is provided by Vancouver Coastal 
Health). 
130. See discussion supra Part II.B.  See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
131. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (arguing that mere possession of a weapon in a school 
zone is non-economic). 
132. Id. at 549. 
133. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 336 (1971). 
134. Id. at 337. 
135. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. 
136. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018) (possession). 
137. 21 U.S.C. § 801(A)(3)–(6) (2018).  Specifically, the findings state, “[l]ocal 
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be in possession of the drugs regardless, and the facility itself does not 
contribute.  Only consumption is directly impacted, and that impact is 
merely one of setting.  In this light, the possession and consumption, 
separated from the underlying transaction, must likewise be non-
economic. 
The Court has also refused to consider the aggregate impacts of non-
economic activity.138  Even if the Court was willing to do so, it would be 
a stretch to say that consumption or possession within a SIF could 
substantially impact interstate commerce, as there is no evidence that a 
SIF would impact the volume of purchase.139  Besides, there are not likely 
to be many facilities to view in the aggregate due to the relatively small 
population of IDUs.140 
Furthermore, congressional prohibition of non-economic activities 
under the commerce power would fail rational basis review when applied 
to the SIF.141  In his concurrence in Raich, Justice Scalia states, 
“Congress’s authority to enact all of these prohibitions of intrastate 
controlled-substance activities depends only upon whether they are 
appropriate means of achieving the legitimate end of eradicating Schedule 
I substances from interstate commerce.”142  It is undeniable that 
eradication of illicit use schedule I substances is a legitimate—however 
unrealistic and, arguably, unattainable—goal.  Still, research indicates that 
SIFs neither negatively impact the volume of illicit substances consumed, 
nor do they encourage or promote new users to begin consumption.143  
 
distribution and possession of controlled substances contribute to swelling the interstate traffic 
in such substances.”  Id. at (4). 
138. See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
139. See supra Part I.A. 
140. Amy Lansky et al., Estimating the Number of Persons Who Inject Drugs in the 
United States by Meta-Analysis to Calculate National Rates of HIV and Hepatitis C Virus 
Infections, 9 PLOS ONE, May 2014, at 1, 7, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC4026524/pdf/pone.0097596.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y266-4VJ5].  In 2011, the 
number of past-year users of injected drugs was 0.30%, or 774,434.  Id.  In 2017, the number of 
lifetime users of injected drugs, ages twelve and older, was 1.6%, or approximately 4.4 million.  
Results from the 2017 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Detailed Tables, SAMHSA, 
tbls. 1.96A & 1.96B, https://www.samhsa.gov/data/report/2017-nsduh-detailed-tables 
[https://perma.cc/5TY8-2EUS]. 
141. Rational basis review is the least restrictive standard utilized by Courts in evaluating 
the constitutional claims, requiring only that the government have a legitimate state interest and 
that the means are rationally related.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 40 (2005) (Scalia, 
J. concurring). 
142. Id. 
143. HEDRICH, supra note 117, at 73, 83.  Additionally, some facilities exclude addicted 
users who come to the facility wanting to inject for the first time.  Id. at 10. 
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Therefore, prohibition of the SIF is not an appropriate means to achieve a 
legitimate goal, leaving the SIF within the Court’s holding. 
However convincing (or not) the argument that the SIF is consistent 
with commerce power jurisprudence may be, its fate is more uncertain 
than one would hope.  The greatest risk to SIFs is the malleability of the 
substantial effects test, as judges are left with wide discretion in how they 
categorize activities.144  Should the Court eventually be faced with the 
issue of determining the constitutionality of a state law authorizing SIFs, 
the particular political leanings of the Justices may dictate how the activity 
is classified.145  Therefore, it may be more useful and predictable for states 
considering SIF legislation to conduct a thorough federal preemption 
analysis in preparation for a constitutional challenge.  Should the Court 
determine that the concept of the SIF falls within the reach of the CSA, 
the language of enacted legislation will become incredibly important. 
B. Application of the CSA to SIFs Violates the Tenth Amendment and 
States’ Police Power to Regulate Medical Practices 
The Tenth Amendment provides “[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are 
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”146  Those powers 
typically regarded as reserved to the states comprise what are commonly 
referred to as police powers—the state’s right to enact and enforce laws 
vital to the protection of public safety, health, and welfare.147  These 
powers generally include, inter alia, employment,148 state-level criminal 
sanctions, and the regulation of medical practices.149  In these areas, state 
legislation carries weight over attempts at federal regulation.150 
It is well settled that states also have within their police powers the 
authority to regulate illicit substances and “[t]he right to exercise this 
power is so manifest in the interest of public health and welfare, that it is 
unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of it beyond saying that it is too 
 
144. John C. Roberts, Jr., The Siren Song of Federalism: Gonzales v. Oregon, 12 HOLY 
CROSS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 107 (2008). 
145. Id. 
146. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
147. Police Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
148. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 588 (2011). 
149. Pack v. Super. Ct., 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 647 (Ct. App. 2011), review granted and 
opinion superseded sub nom. Pack v. S.C., 268 P.3d 1063 (Cal. 2012). 
150. In his concurring opinion in Lopez, Justice Thomas stated, “[W]e always have 
rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit 
Congress to exercise a police power . . . .”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) 
(Thomas, J. concurring) (emphasis in original). 
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firmly established to be successfully called in question.”151  In Robinson 
v. California, the Supreme Court discussed valid ways in which a state 
could regulate narcotics, including compulsory treatment, public 
education, and efforts to address the underlying socioeconomic problems 
that contribute to substance abuse.152  The Court stated, “the range of valid 
choice which a State might make in this area is undoubtedly a wide 
one.”153  The SIF falls within this broad range of choice, and its fashioning 
as a medical facility ties it contemporaneously to the states’ authority to 
regulate medical practices. 
The reach of the CSA in regulating medical practices is addressed in 
Gonzales v. Oregon.154  In Gonzalez, the Court upheld a state law 
authorizing physicians to prescribe medications to terminally ill patients 
in order to hasten end of life.155  The federal government argued that 
physician-assisted suicide was not a legitimate medical purpose and was 
in violation of the CSA.156  The Court rejected this argument, instead 
giving weight to the idea that the CSA did not grant authority to “displace 
the states as the primary regulators of the medical profession, or to 
override a state’s determination as to what constitutes legitimate medical 
practice.”157  The CSA’s only role in regulating medical practice is to 
prevent doctors from using their ability to write prescriptions to engage in 
drug dealing or trafficking.158  Therefore, the CSA did not authorize the 
Attorney General “to make a rule declaring illegitimate a medical standard 
for care and treatment of patients that is specifically authorized under state 
law.”159 
The Court’s holding in Gonzalez strengthens the argument that 
implementing a SIF is a valid use of police power.  State laws authorizing 
a SIF program as a part of a medical facility that provides MAT, access to 
substance abuse treatment, and primary care, among other services, surely 
 
151. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664 (1962) (quoting Whipple v. Martinson, 
256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921)) (discussing valid ways in which a state could regulate narcotics within 
the state, and holding that the criminalization of addiction was not one). 
152. Id. at 665. 
153. Id. 
154. See generally Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
155. Id. 
156. 21 U.S.C. § 829(a).  The CSA regulates physicians’ abilities to prescribe schedule II 
substances.  Id. 
157. Gonzalez, 546 U.S. at 253 (quoting Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to Sen. 
Orrin Hatch, on Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act (June 5, 1998)). 
158. Id. at 270. 
159. Id. at 258. 
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fall under the category of legitimate medical practices.160  Armed with 
authority to determine what constitutes legitimate medical practice, states 
have the right to implement policies and laws supporting the programs 
they deem necessary to protect the health and wellbeing of their citizens. 
The Court in Gonzalez does point to a provision of Title I of the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (the 
CSA is Title II) indicating Congressional intent to allow for regulation of 
treatment for individuals with addiction.161  Initially, this may appear 
problematic for the SIF; however, the harm reduction measure is not 
merely addressing the addiction, but also the other public health risks 
associated with drug use.162  Additionally, most, if not all, substance abuse 
programs are regulated at the state level, and each program chooses which 
type of evidence-based practice it uses.163  Harm reduction is one of the 
evidence-based practices available and is largely supported by the medical 
community as an efficacious approach to substance abuse treatment.164  
Furthermore, states’ attempts to authorize SIFs through legislation would 
embody the desire to inform Congress of the need to shift toward more 
successful treatment approaches and address the stigma that stifles the use 
of lifesaving interventions.165 
Although this Note does not argue that it is a fundamental right to use 
illicit substances in a safe environment, many of the policy reasons and 
rationales of substantive due process jurisprudence speak to the ability of 
the state to regulate regarding the public health and welfare of its citizens, 
which would include a preventive health care measure like the SIF.166  The 
 
160. See About Supervised Injection Facilities (SIFs), MASS. MED. SOC’Y (June 5, 2017), 
http://www.massmed.org/Advocacy/Key-Issues/Opioid-Abuse/About-Supervised-Injection-
Facilities-(SIFs)/#.W_HH6i3MyL8 [https://perma.cc/2JA7-ZZF3]. 
161. Gonzalez, 546 U.S. at 271 (citing 42 U.S.C § 290bb-2a). 
162. See supra Part I.A. 
163. See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE DIRS., STATE 
REGULATIONS ON SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER PROGRAMS & COUNSELORS: AN OVERVIEW 
(2012), http://www.hazelden.org/web/public/document/nasadadstateregulations.pdf. 
164. See About Supervised Injection Facilities, supra note 160. 
165. Austin Raynor, The New State Sovereignty Movement, 90 IND. L.J. 613, 637 (2015) 
(“[S]tate statutes that permit conduct otherwise prohibited by federal law have the capacity to 
lessen the social stigma such conduct normally invites.”). 
166. There is an argument to be made that a fundamental right to healthcare is emerging 
(or has emerged) and could be expanded to include the SIF as part of evidence-based substance 
abuse treatment.  See Gregory D. Curfman, King v. Burwell and a Right to Health Care, 
HEALTH AFFAIRS (June 26, 2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20150626.048913/full/ [https://perma.cc/E8ZQ-BB3J].  “Strict scrutiny” is a standard of 
review used by courts in evaluating the constitutionality of laws that requires the government 
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state has a compelling interest in public health and safety of its citizens 
threatened by the opioid epidemic.  The SIF is a narrowly tailored means 
to address the specific problem of overdose deaths and spread of 
infectious diseases within an underserved, at-risk population (generally 
homeless, mental health issues, etc.167).  Even if there is no fundamental 
right, the idea that a law should pass the muster of strict scrutiny speaks 
to its importance.168 
C. A Brief Aside: Prosecutorial Discretion Regarding Marijuana 
Indicates a Policy Shift and Cedes Some Power to the States 
Even armed with the CSA and supporting case law from the Supreme 
Court, the federal government has shifted its policies of enforcement with 
regard to marijuana.169  Similar to the emergence of widespread harm 
reduction methods, the development and acceptance of state-level 
marijuana legalization was slow and arduous.170  The federal 
government’s shift from enforcement against marijuana growers and 
dispensaries in states with legalization laws speaks to its willingness to 
allow states to be the “laboratories.”171 
Notwithstanding the Court’s holding in Raich, the federal 
government has begun, over the years, to turn a blind eye to states’ 
legalization policies.172  Thirty-three states and D.C. have legalized 
marijuana in one form or another, to include recreational and medicinal 
 
to demonstrate it has a compelling interest and that the means are narrowly tailored.  See 
generally Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). 
167. See HEDRICH, supra note 117, at 9. 
168. The author recognizes the tenuous argument, and a full fundamental rights analysis 
is beyond the scope of this Note. 
169. See Matthew A. Melone, Federal Marijuana Policy: Homage to Federalism in 
Form; Potemkin Federalism in Substance, 63 WAYNE L. REV. 215, 264–65 (2018), for a 
discussion on the troubling impacts of the federal government’s lack of enforcement of its own 
laws. 
170. See id. at 220–23 (comparing the shift in public attitudes regarding marijuana laws 
to that of same-sex marriage). 
171. See generally James A. Gardner, The “States-as-Laboratories” Metaphor in State 
Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 475 (1996).  Courts often use this metaphor to support 
a position that the government should “exercise restraint in displacing state law even when such 
displacement is concededly constitutionally permitted.”  Id. at 485 n.37.  Interestingly, the 
legislative history of the CSA suggests there was “rising support for moderation of the Federal 
marihuana laws.”  See HARRY L. HOGAN, FEDERAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT (TITLES 
II & III, P.L. 91-513): SUMMARY AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Rep. No. 80-74 EPW at 50 
(1980).  The new policy shift may in part represent the realization of older, more moderate 
views. 
172. Melone, supra note 169, at 265 (discussing how the federal government 
“categorically announce[d] it will not enforce a law under particular circumstances”). 
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use, and generally decriminalized possession below a certain quantity.173  
The federal government has largely refrained from enforcing the CSA so 
long as states maintain robust legalization and regulatory schemes that 
ensure certain federal priorities are met.174  Federal challenges to state 
laws have decreased and federal funds are prohibited from being used for 
enforcement purposes.175  Moreover, despite the textual hook in the CSA, 
the federal government has not used, or minimally used, § 856 as a means 
for prosecuting marijuana dispensaries.176  Marijuana dispensaries clearly 
fall under § 856—they are buildings or structures owned, rented, or 
operated with the intent to distribute a controlled substance.  Yet there is 
minimal evidence of charges brought by the federal government against a 
 
173. State Marijuana Laws in 2019 Map, GOVERNING, https://www.governing.com/gov-
data/safety-justice/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html 
[[https://perma.cc/HU45-6QKH].  See ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.010 (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 36-28.1 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-101, et seq. (West 2018); Compassionate Use 
Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996); COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 16; CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-408, et seq. (West 2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4701, et seq. (West 
2018); FLA. STAT. § 893.13, et seq. (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 329-121 (2018); 410 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 310 (West 2014); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1046 (2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 22, § 2422 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-601 (West 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 94G, § 1–21 (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.27952 (West 2018); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 152.22 (West 2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 579.015 (2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-
301 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431A.010, et seq. (West 2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 318-B:2-c (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-1 (West 2010); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3360 
(McKinney 2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3796.02 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, 
§ 420 (West 2018); H.B. 3400, 78th Leg. Assemb. (Or. 2015); S.B. 3, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 
2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. tit. 21, § 21-28.6-4 (West 2018); H.B. 3001, 2018 Utah Laws 3d 
Sp. Sess. ch. 1 (Utah 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4472–74 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 69.50.325 (West 2017); W. VA. CODE § 16-8A-1–17 (2017). 
174. See Memorandum from James Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Attorneys (Aug. 
29, 2013) [hereinafter Cole Memo].  Priorities include: preventing profits from sale from going 
to organized crime; sale to minors; intoxicated driving; diversion from states where marijuana 
is legal to those in which it is not; violence stemming from cultivation/distribution; growing on 
public land; and use and/or possession on federal property.  Id.  The government enforces the 
CSA in situations where there is noncompliance with the state’s regulatory scheme.  United 
States v. Campbell, No. 17-30208, 2019 WL 384535, at *2 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 2019) (finding the 
defendant was not in compliance with the strict state regulations regarding the cultivation of 
marijuana). 
175. See Michael Rosenblum, Rohrabacher-Blumenauer Amendment Included in 




176. See, e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-op, 532 U.S. 483, 491 
(2001) (holding that medical necessity is not a defense to distribution charges).  This case and 
many early cases were brought by the federal government seeking to enjoin dispensaries from 
distributing marijuana, claiming it was a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). 
 
2020] SUPERVISING CONSUMPTION 119 
medical or recreational marijuana dispensary under the statute alone.177  
The lack of charges under § 856 may be due to the fact that the holding in 
Raich permitted enforcement of federal laws without the use of the 
§ 856.178  Nevertheless, the relative lack of enforcement speaks to the 
willingness of the federal government to support and even encourage 
prosecutorial discretion. 
In 2013, former Deputy Attorney General James Cole issued a memo 
to all U.S. Attorneys addressing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in 
enforcement of federal drug policies.179  The memo encouraged discretion 
in states with appropriate legislative and regulatory schemes governing 
marijuana cultivation, distribution, and possession that mitigated the 
concerns of Department of Justice (DOJ).180  The memo outlined the 
DOJ’s primary objectives and priorities with regard to marijuana.181  The 
memo declares “[t]he primary question in all cases . . . should be whether 
the conduct at issue implicates one or more of the enforcement 
priorities,”182 indicating that if it does not, then prosecutors should restrict 
their pursuit of the case, saving valuable and limited resources.183  This 
sort of policy shift on the part of the government, to not actively pursue 
purported violations of the CSA, lends weight to a more state-centric 
interpretation and application of the law and current jurisprudence in cases 
where support for the underlying state law or medical practice exists. 
Parts II and III laid the foundational background of existing statutory 
and common law principles used to analyze the SIF as a valid exercise of 
state police power and discussed how the harm reduction measure would 
fare in light of the leading commerce power jurisprudence.  Although this 
Note argues the SIF is beyond the scope of the CSA, should the Supreme 
 
177. See United States v. Lynch, 2010 WL 1848209 (C.D. Cal. 2010).  Cases involving 
charges against dispensaries typically implicate activity incongruent with state law.  In Lynch, 
evidence suggested the defendant’s business produced a profit and sold to individuals with no 
medical need.  Id. at 9.  However, threats of enforcement were made against landlords and 
mortgagees, and those did lead to many pre-emptive foreclosures.  Charles Kreindler & Michael 
Emmick, Got Pot? The Feds Try to Make Mortgagee Banks Liable Under the Crack House 
Statute, WHITE COLLAR DEF. BLOG (Jan. 19, 2012), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/got-
pot-the-feds-try-to-make-mortgagee-008091/ [https://perma.cc/NNT3-HY2A]. 
178. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
179. Cole Memo, supra note 174. 
180. Id. (rescinded by Jeffrey B. Sessions, Memorandum for All United States Attorneys: 
Marijuana Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018)). 
181. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
182. Cole Memo, supra note 174, at 3. 
183. See id.  The shifting political climate under Republican President Donald Trump led 
former AG Jeff Sessions to rescind the Cole Memo; however, it appears to be business as usual 
under the Cole Memo policy. 
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Court one day find otherwise, properly worded legislation will be vital to 
successful implementation of the SIF.184  The final section of this Note 
discusses the federal preemption doctrine and applies the preemption 
framework to potential state laws authorizing the SIF concept.  
IV. STATE-LEVEL SIF LEGISLATION AND THE FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
DOCTRINE 
In light of recent challenges185 and threats against proposed SIFs,186 
state-level legislative authorization would be optimal for implementing 
SIFs.  Such legislation could come in the form of simply expanding SEP 
laws to include consumption or changes to the policies of a public health 
administrative body.187  To date, no state has authorized legislation 
approving the implementation of SIF programs.188  However, there is 
precedential support for the survival state laws presumably at odds with 
federal laws under the federal preemption doctrine.189  Passing a federal 
preemption analysis would bolster the argument that the SIF is beyond the 
scope of the CSA. 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution declares 
federal law the “supreme law of the land.”190  However, when it comes to 
areas that are traditionally regulated by states, there exists a presumption 
against federal preemption.191  The Court has long assumed “that the 
historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded . . . unless 
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”192  Therefore, when 
 
184. It should be noted that with regard to state-level marijuana laws, the Supreme Court 
explicitly did not address the issue of federal preemption in Raich.  Luke C. Waters, Does 
Federal Law Preempt State Marijuana Law?  Analyzing the “Conflict”, COLO. LAWYER 34, 38 
(2018), https://www.cobar.org/Portals/COBAR/TCL/Dec%202018/CLDec18_Features_
Cannabis.pdf.  The Court found federal supremacy solely through the commerce power.  Id. 
185. See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. Safehouse, No. 2:19-cv-00519-GAM (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 5, 2019), ECF No. 1. 
186. Spencer Buell, In Opening a Safe Injection Site, Somerville Would Call Feds’ Bluff, 
BOS. MAGAZINE (August 14, 2019, 12:21 PM), https://www.bostonmagazine.com/
news/2019/08/14/somerville-safe-injection-site/ [https://perma.cc/ZU6M-2NLV]. 
187. Beletsky et al., supra note 27, at 233. 
188. See supra note 66. 
189. See infra Part IV.A. 
190. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
191. Viva! Int’l Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc.,162 
P.3d 569, 573 (Cal. 2007). 
192. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Gade v. Nat’l Solid 
Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88,115–19 (1992) (Souter, J. concurring).  The regulation of 
state-level criminal sanctions for illicit substances and medical practices are historically within 
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a state law is at odds with a federal law, we must undertake a federal 
preemption analysis to determine if the state law represents a valid 
exercise of its police powers. 
A. The Savings Clause Clearly Indicates Only a Conflict Would 
Trigger Preemption 
As discussed in Part II.A, the CSA governs federal drug policy in the 
United States.193  The government challenges the concept of the SIF as 
being illegal under the CSA, specifically § 856, the “crack-house” 
statute.194  However, examination of the legislative evidence leads one to 
view the SIF as outside the bounds of § 856.195  Another provision exists 
within the Act that further supports the conclusion that the SIF is beyond 
the reach of the CSA—§ 903.196  Section 903 contains the following 
language: 
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an 
intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which that 
provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of 
any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be 
within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict 
between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the 
two cannot consistently stand together.197 
This “[a]pplication of State law” provision sets up the federal 
preemption analysis. 
When evaluating for preemption under the CSA, courts have upheld 
state laws “[i]n the absence of unambiguous statutory language supporting 
a stay or evidence that Congress clearly intended that the federal 
government have exclusive jurisdiction.”198  Federal preemption may be 
explicit within the language of the statute, or it may be implicitly stated.199  
 
states’ police powers.  Qualified Patients Ass’n v. City of Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 106 
(Ct. App. 2010). 
193. See supra Part II.A. 
194. See supra Part II.A; see also Complaint at 5, United States v. Safehouse, No. 2:19-
cv-00519-GAM (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2019), ECF No. 1. 
195. See supra Part II.A. 
196. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2018). 
197. Id. 
198. City of Hartford v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 1339, 1342 (Conn. 1993); see also In re Belsha, 
343 N.Y.S.2d 481, 483 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973) (holding the anti-preemption clause of the CSA 
did not preclude state prosecution or reserve such prosecution to the Federal government). 
199. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). 
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There are two types of implied preemption: (1) field preemption and (2) 
conflict preemption.200 
The language of § 903 makes clear that Congress did not intend the 
federal government to have exclusive jurisdiction, and there is no explicit 
preemption of state law.201  Next, the language must be examined to 
determine if there is any implicit preemption.  Field preemption exists 
when Congress expresses intent to “occupy the field.”202  In § 903, the 
language specifically states there is no such intent.203  Thus, a state law 
authorizing SIFs will only be invalidated by the CSA if it can be shown 
that the two are in conflict, meaning compliance with the state law will 
result in noncompliance with federal law.204 
The question then becomes whether or not the concept of a state-
authorized supervised injection facility can co-exist with the CSA as a 
whole.205  The general purpose and intent of the CSA is to provide 
meaningful, comprehensive regulation of the manufacture, distribution, 
possession, and importation of illicit substances.206  Courts have 
interpreted various other purposes, such as “to conquer drug abuse and to 
control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.”207  
In applying the conflict analysis to state and local marijuana laws, they 
often survive federal preemption because they do not prohibit the federal 
 
200. Id. at 98–99 (holding that state occupational safety laws were in conflict with the 
Federal OSH Act because the language of the statute specifically required any state regulation 
to be submitted and approved by the Secretary). 
201. See 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2018); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664 (1962).  This 
assertion is strengthened by the fact that states have adopted state-level laws regarding the 
regulation and criminalization of illicit substances.  See, e.g., Massachusetts Controlled 
Substances Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, §§ 1–49 (2017). 
202. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“The scheme of federal 
regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room 
for the States to supplement it.”). 
203. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2018). 
204. Gade, 505 U.S. at 109 (Kennedy, J. concurring); Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 
U.S. 654, 658 (1982). 
205. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98.  “Our ultimate task in any pre-emption case is to determine 
whether state regulation is consistent with the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole.”  
Id. (emphasis added). 
206. See generally HARRY L. HOGAN, FEDERAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT (TITLES 
II & III, P.L. 91–513): SUMMARY AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, REP. NO. 80-74 EPW, at 50 
(1980). 
207. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12 (2005); see also Joe Hemp’s First Hemp Bank v. 
City of Oakland, No. C 15-05053 WHA, 2016 WL 375082, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2016). 
 
2020] SUPERVISING CONSUMPTION 123 
enforcement of the CSA; rather, they represent the state’s decision to “not 
independently prohibit the conduct proscribed under the CSA.”208 
Similarly, here, there would be no glaring conflict between the CSA 
and a state law authorizing a SIF as to overall purpose.  Distribution, 
manufacturing, and trafficking are not at issue: the sole object of the 
CSA’s primary purpose at issue is possession.  The SIF would not prohibit 
possession of an illicit substance, but it also would not require 
possession.209  Courts have upheld state laws that do not require an 
individual (or agency) to go against the CSA, and found preemption in 
cases where compliance with the state law does, in fact, require violation 
of federal law.210 
For example, in Pack v. Superior Court, the court struck down a city 
ordinance as preempted by the CSA.211  The ordinance mandated that 
lawfully permitted marijuana collectives have their product tested by 
independent laboratories, which in turn required an individual to possess 
and distribute marijuana—a clear violation of the CSA.212  Conversely, in 
Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the 
Michigan Medical Marijuana Act as not preempted by the CSA.213  The 
court noted that while a provision prohibited the full incorporation of the 
CSA’s marijuana prohibition, it did not require violation of the federal 
prohibition; therefore, the Act was not preempted by the CSA.214 
Similarly, a state law authorizing SIFs would not require any 
individual to violate federal law.  One is not required to consume or even 
possess an illegal drug in order to utilize the services a SIF offers.  
Participants may utilize the facility for many other purposes: for 
 
208. Patient Advocacy Coal. Found. (RIPAC) v. Town of Smithfield, No. PC-2017-2989, 
2017 WL 4419055, at *7 (R.I. Super Ct. Sept. 27, 2017); see City of Palm Springs v. Luna 
Crest, Inc., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 128, 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (“[T]he City’s regulatory program 
for medical marijuana dispensaries neither conflicts with federal law, nor stands as an obstacle 
to its purpose and objectives.”). 
209. California’s Compassionate Use Act made it lawful to possess marijuana for 
medicinal purposes.  Compassionate Use Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 
1996).  Laws authorizing SIFs would not seek to legalize possession of illicit substances, they 
would merely not enforce their prohibition. 
210. See Pack v. Super. Ct., 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 648 (Ct. App. 2011), opinion 
superseded sub nom. Pack v. S.C., 268 P.3d 1063 (Cal. 2012) (The California Supreme Court 
dismissed the appeal as moot because the ordinance at issue in the case was repealed by the 
city.).  See also Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d. 531, 544–45 (Mich. 2014). 
211. Pack, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 648. 
212. Id. at 649–50. 
213. Ter Beek, 846 N.W.2d. at 544–45. 
214. Id. 
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observation after use elsewhere;215 to obtain clean needles; to access 
wound care or other first aid; and to obtain access to services, counseling, 
or medication-assisted treatment.216  Such a state law would merely 
provide immunity from state-level prosecution.217  SIF legislation would 
“not frustrate the CSA’s goal of conquering drug abuse or controlling drug 
traffic.”218  Rather it would demonstrate that “the people . . . chose to part 
ways with Congress only regarding the scope of [§ 856].”219  Therefore, 
state authorization of the SIF would not be in conflict with the CSA and 
would not be preempted by it. 
Admittedly, the argument against federal preemption becomes more 
arduous if focused on § 856, specifically.  At first blush, opening and 
maintaining a property permitting the use of an illicit substance appears to 
be in direct conflict with the language of the provision.  However, the 
purpose for opening and maintaining a SIF is not to simply permit the use 
of illicit substances—its true purpose is to act as a lifesaving overdose 
prevention measure, provide necessary services to which an at-risk 
population otherwise lacks access, and reduce other public health dangers 
associated with opioid addiction.220  This purpose cannot be reconciled as 
violative of a provision within a statute specifically intended to address 
the use of buildings as “crack-houses.”221  
 
215. See SPOT, supra note 46. 
216. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 3. 
217. See HARM REDUCTION COMMISSION REPORT (2019), https://www.mass.gov/
files/documents/2019/03/01/Harm%20Reduction%20Commission%20Report%20%283-1-
2019%29.pdf (discussing the need for legislation to address criminal and civil protections for 
staff in SIFs) [https://perma.cc/358S-ZYUX]. 
218. White Mountain Health Center, Inc. v. Maricopa County, 386 P.3d 416, 426 (Ariz. 
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The state-law immunity AMMA provides does not frustrate the CSA’s goal of 
conquering drug abuse or controlling drug traffic . . . the people of Arizona chose 
to part ways with Congress only regarding the scope of acceptable medical use of 
marijuana.  Possession and use of marijuana not in compliance with AMMA 
remain illegal under Arizona law. 
Id. (quoting Reed-Kaliher v. Hoggatt, 347 P.3d 136, 141–42 (Ariz. 2015) (internal citations 
omitted)). 
219. Id. 
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omitted); see Memorandum at 37–42 United States v. Safehouse, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
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B. The CSA Would Not Preempt SIF Legislation Because the 
Commerce Power Does Not Confer onto Congress the Right to 
Regulate Legitimate Medical Practices  
The authority of federal preemption stems from one of Congress’ 
enumerated powers.  “So long as Congress acts within an area delegated 
to it, the preemption of conflicting state or local action . . . flow[s] directly 
from the substantive source of whatever power Congress is exercising.”222  
The government’s current argument is that the concept of the SIF violates 
the CSA, which is applied to the states under the commerce power.223  Not 
only does this Note argue that the SIF is non-economic in nature, it also 
asserts that the commerce power does not carry the authority to regulate 
as to legitimate medical practices.224  Although Congress acted within its 
power in enacting the CSA, applying it to this sort of medical practice is 
outside its scope.  In Oregon, the Supreme Court held that the CSA had 
no general power to regulate medical practices, and any regulatory power 
granted was limited to prohibiting doctors from abusing their prescription 
writing powers for dealing narcotics.225  For this reason, framing the SIF 
as an overdose-prevention measure that is part of a broader approach to 
protecting public health and welfare is significant to the success of SIF 
legislation.  Additionally, the presumption against preemption is strongest 
where the issues involve public health and safety as opposed to economic 
regulation.226 
Properly crafted state-level legislation should survive federal 
preemption analysis and be a valid exercise of state police powers.  The 
foregoing analysis is merely a framework within which states may 
consider the feasibility of authorizing legislation and predict outcomes if, 
in the future, enacted laws are challenged under the guise of federalism.  
Just as with other state-led initiatives (i.e., marijuana laws, SEPs), 
achieving the desired outcome will require brave legislative action. 
CONCLUSION 
The SIF concept is controversial, due in part to the stigma 
surrounding intravenous drug use and addiction in the United States, but 
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more directly due to the conflict between states’ rights to regulate 
regarding public health and welfare of its citizens and federal law.  Within 
the treatment field, harm reduction methods have become the increasingly 
utilized approach to treating opioid addiction.227  Federal laws have long 
encumbered harm reduction practices; though some evolved, others still 
stand as obstacles to providing effective, life-saving interventions to our 
most vulnerable populations.228 
 States and organizations that have contemplated legislation or 
proposed opening SIFs face the threat of prosecution by the federal 
government for violation of the CSA, which gets its teeth in application to 
state-level laws through the commerce power.229  However, thoughtful 
application of current commerce power jurisprudence indicates that the 
concept of the SIF is consistent with precedent and should be outside the 
reach of the CSA.  Even if the argument is questionable, the statutory 
construction of the CSA allows for an interpretation based on legislative 
evidence that excludes the SIF from the “crack-house” statute, and would 
easily permit a carve-out explicitly for such facilities.230   
Moreover, application of the federal preemption analysis leans 
toward a finding against preemption.  Section 903 of the CSA explicitly 
leaves room for states to govern regarding drugs, and legislation that is 
drafted in a manner that does not require an actor to violate federal law 
should be sustained.  Finally, the CSA should not preempt state-level 
legislation involving legitimate medical practices, as doing so would be 
outside the scope of the statute. 
The argument that the SIF is a valid exercise of the state’s police 
power should not be taken lightly.  The idea of the “states as laboratories” 
is imperative to the ability to address and redress significant and serious 
issues at the state level. 
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave 
responsibility.  Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with 
serious consequences to the nation.  It is one of the happy incidents of 
the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
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choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.231 
Federal agencies tend to be reluctant in considering new, 
controversial, and alternative methods to address serious problems.232  
Thus states, through appropriate legislation, should be empowered to 
employ measures believed to be effective with regard to these issues, such 
as the opioid epidemic, without interference from the federal government.  
The public health purpose behind permitting states to legislate regarding 
SIFs is so compelling it too should warrant the government non-action we 
now see with marijuana legislation. 
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